

### Modelling Estimates for Bermuda and Potential impact of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIS)

### 24 April 2020



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## Disclaimer

- Numbers generated through this model cannot be interpreted as predictions of what will occur during a pandemic
- Based on a simplified replication of the results of a more technical and sophisticated analysis
- Provides estimates of what might happen, based on the assumptions and modeling strategy used • Represents an attempt to provide decision makers with potentially useful but heavily caveated information

and choose a good course of action.



The purpose of the model is not to predict the future, it's to influence it, help us prepare for it



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## About the model

- SEIR (Susceptible, Exposed, Infected, Recovered) model
- Based on the parameters in the Imperial College London (ICL) paper
- Guidance from Public Health England (PHE)
  - UKOT COVID-19 Modelling Information Summaries (23 March 2020 and 16 April 2020)

    - R<sub>o</sub> of 2.4 recommended to monitor local situation (Worst Case Scenario)
- Inputs
- Bermuda population data and mortality rates
- Ongoing and to be refined as more information becomes available



• Imperial College modelling report: Impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce COVID-19 mortality and healthcare demand (16 March 2020) https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/medicine/sph/ide/gida-fellowships/Imperial-College-COVID19-NPI-modelling-16-03-2020.pdf

• Reproductive number (R<sub>0</sub> – the average number of secondary cases generated by a single infectious case) may vary based on country characteristics



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### Assumptions

### Infectiousness

- Symptomatic persons infectious from 12 hours prior to the onset of symptoms with peak infectivity of 2-6 days from symptom onset • Asymptomatic persons infectious from 4.6 days after infection
- Symptomatic individuals 50% more infectious than asymptomatic individuals
- Recovery and immunity:
  - On recovery, individuals are immune to re-infection in the short term

### Hospitalization:

- Mean duration from onset of symptoms to hospitalization of 5 days for those requiring hospitalization
- Overall mean duration of hospitalization of 10.4 days
- Severity of cases varies by age
- Non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) affect exposure by impacting the number of contacts for each case





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### COVID-19 (Coronavirus)

## Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs)

### Non-Pharmaceutical Intervention (NPIs)

Case Isolation in the home Triggered by onset of symptoms and implemented immediately

Home Quarantine Triggered by onset of symptoms and implemented immediately

Closure of schools Governmental decision


Social distancing of entire population Governmental decision (consider surveillance triggers such as hospitalizations/critical care capacity)

Social distancing of the most vulnerable Governmental decision (consider surveillance triggers such as hospitalizations/critical care capacity)

|    | Description (when used alone)  |
|----|--|
|    | Symptomatic cases stay at home for <b>7</b> days, reducing non-household contacts by 75% for this period. Household contacts remain unchanged. Assume 70% of household comply with the policy.   |
|    | Following identification of a symptomatic case in the household, all household<br>members remain at home for 14 days. Household contact rates double during this<br>quarantine period, contacts in the community reduce by 75%. Assume 50% of<br>household comply with the policy. |
|    | Closure of all schools. Household contact rates for student families increase by 50% during closure. Contacts in the community increase by 25% during closure.   |
| re | All households reduce contact outside household, school or workplace by 75%. School contact rates unchanged, workplace contact rates reduced by 25%. Household contact rates assumed to increase by 25%.   |
| re | Reduce contacts by 50% in workplaces, increase household contacts by 25% and reduce other contacts by 75%. Assume 75% compliance with policy.  |



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## **Potential impact of NPIs**

- In combination, NPIs are predicted to reduce peak critical care demand by two-thirds and halve the number of deaths
- NPIs should be maintained or transmission may rapidly rebound
- Impact of NPIs influences the timeline
  - **2-3 week** lag between introduction and impact of NPIs
- No easy policy decision to be made
- Ethical and economic implications should be considered







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## Strategies

- 2 strategies evaluated using same NPIs
  - Suppression
    - Reduce the reproduction number, R, to below 1
    - Reduce case numbers to low levels or eliminate human-to-human transmission
    - human population, or until a vaccine becomes available (12-18 months, varying efficacy)
  - Mitigation
    - Slow spread by reducing R, but not to below 1
    - Reduce the health impact of an epidemic
    - to low levels
    - Interventions need to remain in place for as much of the epidemic period as possible
- Overall goal to reduce reproduction number to  $\approx 1$  or just below 1



NPIs (and drugs, if available) need to be maintained – at least intermittently - for as long as the virus is circulating in the

Population immunity builds up through the epidemic, leading to an eventual rapid decline in case numbers and transmission dropping



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## Implications of each strategy

- Suppression
  - Enormous social and economic costs
  - Significant impact on health and well-being in the short and longer-term
  - vaccination, due to lesser build-up of herd immunity

### Mitigation

- Never able to completely protect those at risk from severe disease or death
- Resulting mortality may still be high
- Introducing such interventions too early risks allowing transmission to return once they are lifted (if insufficient herd immunity has developed)
- interventions can be maintained
- of infection is seen once interventions are lifted





• The more successful a strategy is at temporary suppression, the larger the later epidemic is predicted to be in the absence of

Necessary to balance the timing of introduction with the scale of disruption imposed and the likely period over which the

Interventions can limit transmission to the extent that little herd immunity is acquired – leading to the possibility that a second wave



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## **PHE Considerations**

- Bermuda:
  - Slightly older population, poorer outcomes in persons with Afro-Caribbean heritage
- outside of households impacting the epidemic
  - Strong interaction between interventions
  - Difficult to model the effects of removing any one intervention
  - Combined interventions reduce the reproductive number to  $\approx 1$  or just below 1
    - Results in prolonged lower level outbreaks that would last many months
- Wider social distancing/lockdown is an appropriate measure to control strong epidemics
  - Such control measures take up to 10 days to have any evident effect and a further 10 days to show peak effect
- Optimum length of time for implementation of such measures unlikely to be less than 4-6 weeks in most cases.



• Combinations of social and behavioural interventions significantly reduce community contacts



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## **Bermuda Modelling**

### • For simplicity, modelled at a constant reproductive number

- Worst case scenario Reproductive number of 2.4
- Better case scenario Reproductive number of 1.4
  - Creates results most similar to ICL model reflecting impact of combined NPIs
    - Remodelling to occur when ICL releases full code with assistance from PHE

### • For simplicity, modelled at a constant reproductive number

- Local real-time data and intelligence crucial to assess local situation and impact on healthcare capacity
- Estimates of timeline and characteristics of cases must be reviewed based on local situation





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




### Bermuda Modelling: Infections per day

| 1400                                   |
|--|
|  |
| 1200                                   |
|  |
| 1000                                   |
|  |
| 800                                    |
| c00                                    |
| 600                                    |
| 400                                    |
|  |
| 200                                    |
|  |
| 0 0 0 0                                |
| A.Nat. 1. Nat. 20 Nat. 20 Nat. 20 Apr. |
|  |
|  |

Infections per Day (Worst Case Scenario vs Better Case Scenario)








## Bermuda Modelling: Hospitalizations per day

- Hospitalization rate varies by age
  - 0.1% in under 10s 27.3% in over 80s




Hospitalizations per Day (Worst Case Scenario vs Better Case Scenario)





## Bermuda **Modelling: Critical care** hospitalizations per day

- Critical Care Hospitalization rate varies by age
- 5.0% in under 10s 70.9% in over 80s



Critical Care Hospitalizations per Day (Worst Case Scenario vs Better Case Scenario)

| _              | Total Critic | al Care Hosp | oitalizations |
|----------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|
| Scenario       | Total        | Peak         | Peak Date     |
| Worst<br>Case  | 981          | 25           | 22-May-20     |
| Better<br>Case | 359          | 5            | 6-Sept-20     |







## Bermuda Modelling: Deaths per day


 Infection Fatality Ratio varies by age

• 0.002% in under 10s - 9.3% in over 80s

| 50 |           |        |      |
|----|-----------|--------|------|
| 45 |           |        |      |
| 40 |           |        |      |
| 35 |           |        |      |
| 30 |           |        |      |
| 25 |           |        |      |
| 20 |           |        |      |
| 15 |           |        |      |
| 10 |           |        |      |
| 5  |           |        |      |
| 0  |           |        |      |
|    | 11.Mar.20 | Mar.20 | 1.20 |

Deaths per Day (Worst Case Scenario vs Better Case Scenario)

| _              | Total Deaths |      |           |
|----------------|--------------|------|-----------|
| Scenario       | Total        | Peak | Peak Date |
| Worst<br>Case  | 718          | 18   | 22-May-20 |
| Better<br>Case | 263          | 4    | 6-Sept-20 |





### COVD-19(Coronavirus)

## **Recommendations from ICL model**

- - to be tested)
- contacts continue
- Necessary to layer multiple interventions for duration of pandemic to avoid rebound
  - Choice of interventions ultimately depends on relative feasibility of their implementation and likely effectiveness in different social contexts
  - Difficult to be definitive about the duration of measures which will be required
  - Decisions on when and for how long to relax policies will need to be informed by ongoing surveillance

• An adaptive policy in which social distancing is only initiated after pre-determined trigger(s) ICL Suggestion: "on" and "off" thresholds based on weekly confirmed case incidence in ICU patients (a group of patients highly likely

Case-based policies of isolation of symptomatic cases and household quarantine of high-risk



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




### Bermuda Comparison: Infections (Cumulative)

| 2000  |
|---|
| 1800  |
| 1600  |
| 1400  |
| 1200  |
| 1000  |
| 800   |
| 600   |
| 400   |
| 200   |
| 0 -   |
| 4.Mar 20 Mar 20 Mar 20 Mar 20 Mar 20                            |
| 4 <sup>N.</sup> 6 <sup>N.</sup> 8 <sup>N.</sup> 10 <sup>N</sup> |
|   |

Cumulative Confirmed Infections (Worst Case Scenario vs Bermuda Cases vs Better Case Scenario)








### Bermuda Comparison: Infections (Daily)

| 200                               |
|-----------------------------------|
| 200                               |
| 180                               |
| 160                               |
| 140                               |
| 120                               |
| 100                               |
| 80                                |
| 60                                |
| 40                                |
| 20                                |
| 20                                |
| 0 00 00 00                        |
| A.Mar. 20 Mar. 20 Mar. 20 Mar. 20 |

Daily Confirmed Infections (Worst Case Scenario vs Bermuda Cases vs Better Case Scenario)









### Bermuda Comparison: Hospitalizations (Cumulative)

| 140   |      |
|---|------|
| 120   |      |
| 100   |      |
| 80  |      |
| 60  |      |
| 40  |      |
| 20  |      |
| 0<br>4.Mar.20<br>6.Mar.20<br>8.Mar.20<br>10.M | ar20 |

Cumulative Hospitalizations (Worst Case Scenario vs Bermuda Cases vs Better Case Scenario)







### Bermuda **Comparison:** Hospitalizations (Daily)

| 14                                 |
|------------------------------------|
| 12                                 |
| 10                                 |
| 8                                  |
| 6                                  |
| 4                                  |
| 2                                  |
|                                    |
| 0<br>4.Mar.20 Mar.20 Mar.20 Mar.20 |
|                                    |






## Bermuda Comparison: Critical Care Hospitalizations (Cumulative)

| 60  |
|---|
| 50  |
| 40  |
| 30  |
| 20  |
| 10  |
| 0<br>A.Mar <sup>20</sup> G.Mar <sup>20</sup> 8.Mar <sup>20</sup> 10.Mar <sup>20</sup> |


Cumulative Critical Care Hospitalizations (Worst Case Scenario vs Bermuda Cases vs Better Case Scenario)







## Bermuda **Comparison: Critical Care** Hospitalizations (Daily)



**Daily Critical Care Hospitalizations** 






### Bermuda Comparison: Deaths (Cumulative)

| 25   |
|--|
| 20   |
|  |
| 15   |
| 10   |
| 5  |
| 0<br>4.Mar.20<br>6.Mar.20<br>8.Mar.20<br>10.Mar.20 |
|  |


### Cumulative Deaths (Worst Case Scenario vs Bermuda Cases vs Better Case Scenario)








### Bermuda Comparison: Deaths (Daily)







# COVID-19 (Coronavirus)

## Conclusions

- Imperial College London:
  - Early action is important, and interventions need to be in place well before healthcare capacity is overwhelmed

  - The social and economic effects of the measures which are needed to achieve this policy goal will be profound

### • Public Health England:

- Rapid case identification, case-isolation, and contact tracing/isolation must remain the mainstay of management
- them and their households effectively and to rapidly trace and isolate contacts of any cases

### • World Health Organization (16 April 2020)

- The most plausible scenario may involve recurring waves interspersed with periods of low-level transmission

Measures should adapt and evolve based on local surveillance information (triggers) to reduce healthcare demand and mortality

• Crucial to continue enhanced surveillance and ensure health services are on high alert to rapidly identify suspected cases, isolate

• From: Interim Guidance: Considerations in adjusting public health and social measures in the context of COVID-19 accessed 20 April 2020



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